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Abstract
Motivated by multiple real-world settings, we determine a social welfare-maximizing
regulator’s tax policies that induce a profit-maximizing polluting firm to make green tech-
nology choices. Using a game-theoretic approach we compare the optimal tax and social
welfare over two periods under two scenarios: (1) a regulator committing to a tax level for
both periods at the beginning of the first period; (2) a regulator who sets the same tax at
the beginning of each period without disclosing this information to the firm (i.e. the firm is
not aware of the second period tax in the first period). We find that regulators can achieve
a higher social welfare when two-period commitments are made. Moreover, the outcomes
in the commitment policy are less sensitive to small deviations in the optimal tax level.
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Many governments utilize environmental policies to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in
an effort to combat the negative impacts of climate change. Some examples of popular
environmental policies are subsidies, feed-in-tariffs, and carbon taxes, which are used to
either incentivize the transition to a greener economy, or disincentivize the emissions of
greenhouse gases. Many governments have successfully reduced their emissions by imple-
menting environmental policies. For example, British Columbia’s carbon tax, introduced
in 2008, required fuel-producing firms to pay a tax per unit of carbon emissions (Yamazaki,
2017). In a review of the success of the BC carbon tax by Murray and Rivers (2015), sim-
ulations and empirical models suggest that the carbon tax reduced emissions in British
Columbia by 5-15%, with negligible effects on the economy.
However, not all environmental policies are successful. For example, in 2009, the gov-
ernment of Ontario, Canada signed a feed-in-tariff agreement to guarantee a price on
wind energy in order to encourage the development of the wind energy sector (Yatchew
and Baziliauskas, 2011). In response, wpd, a German company that finances wind projects
around the world, began construction of the White Pines Wind Farm project (Global News,
2019). After construction had already started, the Ontario government passed the White
Pines Termination Act, that cancelled the feed-in tariff agreement with wpd, as well as
forced the White Pines Wind Farm to close. It is estimated that wpd is seeking to recoup
$100 million from the government of Ontario, but this may not be the only impact (Global
News, 2018). In an interview with The Globe and Mail, Berlin’s ambassador to Canada
warned, “Obviously, every incoming government has the right to change policy direction.
But to have a unilateral cancellation pushed through by law that way is unsettling for the
company, but is also something that will unsettle other potential investors” (The Globe
and Mail, 2018). This example makes it clear that a lack of policy commitment can have
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detrimental effects to firms, environmental outcomes, and governments. The literature
reaffirms this assertion. In a comprehensive review of carbon policy uncertainty, Romano
and Fumagalli (2018) conclude that carbon tax uncertainty often results in delayed in-
vestment in greener technologies, slowing the achievement of environmental targets. Thus,
when studying the impact of environmental policies, policy commitment is an important
aspect to consider. Motivated by events observed in practice and the scientific literature,
we consider the following research questions:
• What is the impact of policy commitment on the maximum achievable social welfare
and optimal tax on carbon?
• How does firm profit and environmental impact change between the commitment and
no commitment policies?
In this dissertation, we further explore the impact of policy commitment on the success
of a carbon tax policies by directly comparing the optimal tax, social welfare, and firm
profit under commitment and no commitment scenarios. Our relation to existing literature
is found in Section 2. More specifically, we determine the optimal carbon tax a regulator
sets for a monopolistic, profit-maximizing, pollution-producing firm in order to maximize
social welfare, which depends on the firm’s profit and associated environmental impact and
consumer surplus. We consider a two-period game for the regulator-firm interaction. The
regulator sets a tax level at the beginning of each period, and the firm responds to the tax
by setting a price for their product and selecting a production process to maximize their
profit. The firm can select a green or dirty production process, where the green production
process yields less emissions per product but at a higher per-unit production cost. We
also consider that consumers are willing to pay more when a greener production process is
used.
Our key contributions come from comparing the optimal decisions made by the regula-
tor and firm in a commitment and a no commitment scenario. In the commitment scenario,
the regulator commits to a fixed tax over both periods at the beginning of the first period,
allowing the firm to plan for future decisions. In the no commitment model, the regulator
sets a tax at the beginning of each period, but maintains the same tax level in the second
period. In other words, at the beginning of the first period, the firm has no information
about the tax that will be set in the second period (or if there will even be a tax at all),
impeding long-term planning for the firm. This no commitment model reflects the scenario
in which a regulator renews a tax policy without guaranteeing the policy’s renewal to the
firm when it is first introduced.
The key contributions of our work are the following:
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• a regulator can achieve a higher social welfare under the commitment policy, with a
lower optimal tax level under certain conditions
• the firm profit and consumer surplus are higher, and the environmental impact is
lower under the commitment policy when compared to the no commitment policy at
any tax level
• the outcomes in the commitment policy are less sensitive to small deviations from
the optimal tax than the outcomes in the no commitment policy
These findings can provide insights for policymakers designing carbon tax policies by
shedding light on the impact commitment has on a policy’s effectiveness.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. We discuss the related re-
search on sustainable operations management and environmental economics in Section 2.
The game-theoretic model is formulated in Section 3 and analyzed in Section 4. We pro-
vide numerical examples in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the theoretical and managerial




Our research is related to two streams of literature: sustainable operations management and
environmental economics. Environmental polices are being used by governments around
the world as a mechanism to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Many of these policies
aim to incentivize firms to switch to a greener production technology, for example, through
subsidies to make green technologies cheaper, or through taxes that make polluting tech-
nologies more expensive (Yuyin and Jinxi, 2018). As a result, supply chain managers must
consider the costs these environmental policies have on their operations and adjust their
decisions accordingly (Drake and Spinler, 2013).
In the operations management literature, technology choice under a carbon tax policy
is well studied. Closely related to our work, Krass et al. (2013) determine the tax level
required to induce a firm to switch to a green technology in their production process under
a fixed carbon tax policy. Krass et al. (2013) conclude that higher tax levels may initially
induce the use of green technologies, but larger tax increases may cause a switch back to
dirty technologies, highlighting the non-monotone behaviour of a carbon tax. Investigating
a firm’s technology and capacity decisions under a fixed carbon tax policy, Drake et al.
(2016) study how profits and emissions differ under a cap-and-trade policy. Shen et al.
(2020) examine the influence of a fixed carbon tax on green technology adoption in supply
chains with competition and pollution-sensitive demand. The impact of carbon taxes and
carbon tariffs on green technology choice and carbon leakage is studied by Drake (2018).
Gao and Zheng (2017) consider a three-stage Stackelberg game between a firm able to
invest in green technology and a regulator that sets a fixed tax. Interestingly, Gao and
Zheng (2017) consider the firm to be the Stackelberg leader to model the scenario where
the regulator has low commitment power. Studying the optimal carbon tax policy under
competition between green and dirty firms, Jin et al. (2018) consider a fixed tax rate that
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may differ between the two firms. Similar to all the papers discussed in this research
stream, we consider how a carbon tax policy impacts the production technology chosen
by a firm, and thus the firm’s emissions output. However, the cited works assume an
unchanging tax rate, allowing firms to plan ahead. Some degree of policy uncertainty
is a reality and will thus plays a role in the adoption of environmental policies by firms
(Romano and Fumagalli, 2018). To consider the impact of policy uncertainty, we directly
compare a commitment and no commitment carbon tax policy over multiple periods. This
comparison sheds light on the impact policy commitment has on the success of a tax policy
– providing insights that are missed when policy uncertainty is not considered.
Carbon tax policies are also well studied in the environmental economics literature.
Yu et al. (2019) examine the influence of a fixed and progressive carbon tax on green
technology adoption in supply chains with competition and pollution-sensitive demand.
Sinha et al. (2013) consider a mining company faced with extraction technology choices
that vary in their environmental impact, with the regulator selecting a new tax level in
every period to maximize social welfare. Unlike our work, Sinha et al. (2013) do not
compare commitment and no commitment policies. However, some articles in this stream
do consider uncertainty when studying carbon tax policies. One way policy uncertainty
is addressed in the literature is when the continuation or commencement of the carbon
tax is uncertain. Using a real options approach, Reedman et al. (2006) study the uptake
of electricity-generation technologies varying in greenness levels, under a carbon tax rate
that comes into effect at a certain date, then comparing these results with that of a policy
that commences at an uncertain date. Fan et al. (2010) study firms facing uncertainty
regarding whether there will be a carbon tax in the next period, with a given probability.
Uncertainty regarding the tax level set by the regulator is also studied. Di Lorenzo et al.
(2012) study the emissions decisions of a power-plant faced with an uncertain carbon tax
rate which follows a normal probability distribution. Similar to these works, we study
the decisions made by firms under a carbon tax policy and (excluding Yu et al. (2019)),
we also explore the impacts of carbon tax policy uncertainty on firm profit and pollution
output. Unlike these works, we consider the case where the firm has no information about
the tax that will be set in each phase. We do not assume the firm has any information
about the probability of a specific tax level being realized or the tax policy commencing.
This assumption relies on some level of commitment by the regulator, that is, where the
regulator ‘commits’ to making decisions based on a probability distribution that is known
to the firm. We instead study the scenario with no commitment by the regulator, resulting
in myopic behaviour from the firm even though the firm is forward looking. We aim to
provide a baseline for no commitment. We then compare the results of the no commitment
and commitment scenario – where the regulator commits to a single tax level for multiple
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periods at the beginning of the planning horizon. We also consider this problem from the
perspective of rational, social-welfare maximizing regulator, not just the firm, a perspective
that is missing from these works (except for Sinha et al. 2013).
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a direct comparison
between a multi-period commitment and no commitment carbon tax policy. Moreover, we
consider a monopolistic firm faced with a discrete production technology choice that varies
in pollution and price per unit, and pollution-sensitive demand. We analyze the decisions
made by the regulator and the firm, leading to the differences in optimal tax level, firm
profit, environmental impact, and social welfare. This leads to insights into the effect of




This section presents a two-period, game-theory model for the interaction between a mo-
nopolistic firm acting in response to the tax set by a social welfare maximizing regulator.
The regulator, being the Stakelberg leader, first sets the tax, followed by the firm selecting
their optimal production technology and price. In the remainder of this section we present
and discuss the decision models of the firm (Section 3.1) and the regulator (Section 3.2),
and end with a detailed description of the game dynamics (Section 3.3). Table 3 outlines
the main notations used throughout this dissertation.
3.1 Firm’s Decision Model
In the ith period, i ∈ {1, 2}, the firm sells their product to consumers at a price, pi, and
selects a production technology, sji , where j indicates the technology type. For simplicity,
we consider a firm faced with two technology choices, that is, j ∈ {g, d} which represent the
green and dirty technology choices, respectively. The technology choice specifies the pollu-
tion emitted per produced unit when using the selected technology. The green technology
choice emits less pollution per product than the dirty technology choice. Consequently,
1 ≤ sgi < sdi .1 The pollution emitted per produced unit when using a particular technology






2. In particular, the demand
for the product in the first period is:
1Both sgi and s
d
i must be greater than or equal to 1 due to the structure of the cost function in (3.3),
to ensure that the variable cost decreases as the firm chooses a dirtier technology.
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pi product price set by the firm in period i (firm decision),
sji pollution emitted per product in period i using technology choice
j ∈ {g, d}, where g and d are the green and dirty technology choices
respectively (firm decision),
a market potential (parameter),
α price sensitivity of demand (parameter),
β pollution sensitivity of demand (parameter),
Di demand function in period i, a function of pi and s
j
i ,
qi quantity of goods produced (firm decision),
f fixed cost (parameter),
γ pollution sensitivity of variable cost of production (parameter),
t tax per unit of emissions (regulator decision),
Ci cost function in period i,
πi profit function in period i,
ε environmental concern of the regulator (parameter),
EIi environmental impact function,
SW social welfare function.
Table 3.1: Main Notations
D1(p1, s
j
1) = a− αp1 − βs
j
1. (3.1)
Where a > 0 is the market potential, and α > 0 and β > 0 are the price and pollution
sensitivity parameters, respectively. We assume demand decreases with price in accordance
with the Law of Demand. In addition, the demand for the product decreases when the firm
chooses a more polluting process, as it is assumed consumers are willing to pay more for a
greener product (following Gao and Zheng (2017); Jin et al. (2018); Shen et al. (2020)).
The demand in the second period follows a similar structure, but we suppose consumers
in the second period are sensitive to the technology choice of the firm in both the first and
second period, linking the demand across both periods. This models consumers that are
sensitive to a firm’s pollution history or the corporate environmental reputation of a firm.
It is known that corporate reputation regarding environmental issues influences consumer
demand in the long term (Mohr and Webb, 2005). Environmentally irresponsible events,
such as the BP oil spill in 2010, can damage corporate environmental reputation, with
negative impacts lasting long after the event takes place (Lin et al., 2016). Applying the
consideration of corporate environmental responsibility to our model, we consider that
consumers are influenced by the firm’s environmental reputation established in the first
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period through the firm’s initial technology choice. Thus, the demand faced by the firm in










For simplicity, we assume that both the first and second period technology choices
are weighted equally (by β) in the demand function for the second period. However,
our numerical exploration suggests our results hold even when sj1 and s
j
2 have different
weightings, see Section 5.1.
The cost of producing a product depends first on the fixed cost, f . The cost relating to
the technology choice is captured by the variable cost of production term, γqi
sji
, where γ > 0
is the variable cost of production parameter, and qi is the quantity of products produced
in period i. We assume that a technology that results in less pollution per product has
a higher variable cost of production, similar to Bi et al. (2017); Yenipazarli and Vakharia
(2015); Yu et al. (2016). If this trade-off does not exist, then the technology choice of
the firm will be trivial – that is, the firm will be able to choose a technology that is both
inexpensive and green, as a greener technology reduces tax and increases demand. The
variable cost of production parameter, γ, captures the difference in variable costs between
green and dirty technologies. As γ increases, the firm saves more when switching to dirtier
technologies. The final cost faced by the firm is the tax paid to the regulator based on the
firm’s pollution output. To encourage the firm to make greener technology choices, the
regulator sets a tax rate, t, per unit of pollution emitted (Krass et al., 2013). The firm
emits sjiqi units of pollution, and thus pays ts
j
iqi in taxes. Consequently, the total cost
faced by the firm in period i is the sum of the fixed cost, variable cost, and tax paid to the
regulator, outlined in Equation (3.3).
Ci(s
j




The firm is profit-maximizing, that is, they are only concerned with how much they
pollute in regards to how it impacts their profit. The profit is defined as the revenue (the
demand times the price) minus the cost. At equilibrium, qi = Di(pi, s
j
i ), and thus the
profit of the firm in period 1 is:
π1(p1, s
j
























Substituting the appropriate demand and cost functions, (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), into
the profit functions (3.4) and (3.5), the profit in period 1 can be written as:
π1(p1, s
j
1) = p1(a− βs
j
1 − αp1)−




1 − αp1)− f, (3.6)





















The total profit, πTotal, is obtained by summing the first and second period profits,
equations (3.6) and (3.7).
3.2 Regulator’s Decision Model
The regulator sets a tax, t, in order to maximize social welfare. The social welfare depends
on the firm’s total profit, previously defined in Section 3.1, the environmental impact of
the firm’s activities, and consumer surplus.
The environmental impact in period i, EIi, is proportional to the total pollution emitted




Where ε is the environmental concern parameter of the regulator and Dis
j
i is the firm’s
total emissions output from producing Di products with technology s
j
i . We suppose society
is concerned with the general advancement of climate change, or about mitigating envi-
ronmental damages in their region. As the regulator and society’s environmental concern
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grows, so does ε. In this dissertation, the only damage to the environment comes from the
firm’s production emissions.
We also consider consumer surplus, the benefit consumers obtain when purchasing
goods at a lower price than they are willing to pay (Marshall, 2009). Mathematically,
consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve above the price set by the firm, i.e.





The maximum price, pmax, is the price at which the demand is zero.




(πi + CSi − EIi) (3.10)
The social welfare function, which reflects the concerns of the regulator and society as
a whole, captures the trade-off between firm profits, consumer surplus, and environmental
damages.
We suppose the regulator does not include tax revenue in the social welfare function,
following Barnett (1980); Requate (2006) and others. Including a tax revenue term in
the social welfare function would cancel out the tax the firm pays to the regulator. In
this case, the tax the firm pays to the regulator, as well as the tax revenue the regulator
receives, would not be considered in the regulator’s decision. To prevent this, along with
any adversarial relationship between the regulator and the firm, we omit the tax revenue
term. In our model, the regulator does not view the tax as a means of revenue generation,
but as a means to regulate firm emissions.
3.3 Game Dynamics
The game dynamics depend on whether or not the regulator commits to a tax policy. When
the regulator does not pre-commit to a fixed tax over both periods, the game dynamics
follow Figure 3.1(a). The regulator chooses a single tax to maximize social welfare over
both periods, but does not disclose this information to the firm at the beginning of the first
period. From the point of view of the firm, the regulator sets a tax at the beginning of the
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first period, and is then free to set a new tax at the beginning of the second period. This
lack of commitment induces the firm to behave myopically, even though we consider that
the firm is forward-looking. The firm is indeed aware that their first period technology
choice will impact the second period demand. However, the firm is unaware of the tax that
will be set in the second period, nor its distribution, making them unaware of how the first
period technology choice will impact the cost faced in the second period. Consequently, the
firm cannot quantify the cost or benefit of the first period technology choice on the second
period profit, even though the firm is forward-looking. Thus, the firm will maximize their
current profit in each of the two periods independently, i.e., exhibit myopic behavior.
The resulting myopic firm behaviour in the case of no commitment arises because the
firm cannot compute an expected second period tax, since there is no information as to
what the second period tax will be (no distribution nor estimated moments are available).
Our work challenges the assumption that firms are aware of the tax that will be set by
the regulator in future periods. Some works have challenged this assumption by consid-
ering that firms do not know for certain what the future tax will be, but they know the
probability distribution of the future tax (see Section 2). We remove the assumption that
the firm can compute an expected tax in the second period based on a probability distri-
bution. In practice, there are known cases where players are unable to construct reliable
probability distributions to account for uncertainty. For example, the government of Al-
berta anticipated a selling price of $58 per barrel of oil in their 2020 budget (Government
of Alberta, 2020). However, this forecast was around 25% too high as of March 2020,
attributed largely to the coronavirus pandemic, resulting in the Treasury Board overesti-
mating provincial revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars (CTV News, 2020). In regards
to this overestimation, the Premier of Alberta claimed, “There is no point in us making sig-
nificant changes to fiscal policy right now when nobody knows how long and how deep the
impact of the coronavirus downturn will be” (CTV News, 2020). This example highlights
that in practice, there are cases where forecasts of future events can be extremely unre-
liable. Moreover, uncertainties such as the coronavirus pandemic may make forecasting
future events extremely difficult. In light of this example, we consider the case where the
firm does not have enough information to estimate the probability distribution of the tax
in the second period. However, we acknowledge that assuming the firm has no information
about the tax set by the regulator in the second period comes with its own modelling and
practical shortcomings. Although abandoning the common prior assumption may be ex-
treme, this work provides a lower bound on outcomes in the case of no policy commitment
– exploring the outcomes when the firm is completely unable to anticipate the future tax.
On the other hand, when the regulator pre-commits to a single tax, and informs the firm
that they are pre-committing for both periods, the game dynamics follow Figure 3.1(b).
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Due to the regulator commitment, the firm can plan their decisions for both periods at the
beginning of the planning horizon.
Period 1 Period 2
(a) No regulator commitment, myopic firm (red)





































Figure 3.1: Game dynamics. Top (red) outlines game dynamics in the no commitment




In this section we present analytical results for the two cases: no regulator commitment
and regulator commitment, and end the section with a direct comparison of the results of
each case. Throughout the analysis, we assume the following:
• The firm is rational and the regulator sets the tax to ensure the firm participates in
the market.
• The firm chooses the green technology if they are indifferent between choosing the
green and dirty technology (i.e., when either choice yields the same profit)
• For tractability purposes, the firm does not discount future profits, and the regulator
does not discount future profits, consumer surplus or environmental impact
4.1 The case of no regulator commitment
Here we analyze the decisions of the firm and regulator in the no commitment scenario,
with game dynamics following Figure 3.1(a). Due to the lack of regulator commitment,
the firm behaves myopically (even though the firm is forward-looking), maximizing their
profit in each period sequentially. The regulator chooses a single tax to maximize social
welfare over both periods (assuming the firm behaves myopically), but does not disclose
this information to the firm at the beginning of the first period. Instead, the regulator
only commits to their chosen tax level at the beginning of each period, not over both
periods from the beginning. From the point of view of the firm, the regulator sets a tax at
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the beginning of the first period, and then sets another, potentially the same, tax at the
beginning of the second period.
4.1.1 First Period
The regulator will set a tax, t, at the beginning of the first period. The firm’s first period




γ(a− βsj1 − αp1)
sj1




1 − αp1)− f. (4.1)






1} to maximize (4.1). Setting the derivative of
(4.1) with respect to p1 to zero and solving for p1 gives the optimal price, p
∗
1. The second
order condition, namely, dπ1
dp1
< 0, is always satisfied, since dπ1
dp1
= −2α < 0 since we assume






2tα− (sj∗1 )2β + αγ
2sj∗1 α
. (4.2)
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That is, the firm will compare its profit at each technology choice, and select the
technology that yields a higher profit at each tax level. The optimal technology choice
depends on the tax set by the regulator. That is, there may not be one technology choice
that maximizes the firms profit at every tax level.
Proposition 1. Suppose the the market size, a, is sufficiently large to guarantee a positive
demand, and the pollution sensitivity of demand, β, is sufficiently small (otherwise the firm









that the firm is indifferent between adopting either technology. The firm will choose the
dirty technology if t < tcritical and the green technology if t ≥ tcritical.






































1) to determine the tax levels at which the dirty technology is preferred.





1) ≥ π1(p∗1, sd1) when t ≥ tcritical.
Note that in the assumptions of Proposition 1 we focus only on cases where the green
or dirty technology is not superior at every tax level, otherwise the technology decision of
the firm is trivial. That is, we assume that by appropriately setting the tax, the regulator
can induce either technology choice in the first period. In other words, we assume that the
critical tax exists, and tcritical > 0.
Proposition 2. The following are characteristics of the critical tax level:
1. The critical tax increases with pollution sensitivity of variable cost, ∂tcritical
∂γ
> 0
2. The critical tax increases with price sensitivity of demand, ∂tcritical
∂α
> 0
3. The critical tax decreases with pollution sensitivity of demand, ∂tcritical
∂β
< 0
Proof. Differentiating tcritical with respect to γ, α and β proves the result.
Proposition 2 provides intuitive characteristics of the critical tax level. First, as the
variable cost of production increases, it means the difference in cost between dirty and green
technologies is increasing. Thus, a higher tax is needed in order for the firm to switch to
a green technology to compensate for the higher variable cost. Second, as consumers are
more sensitive to price, a higher tax is needed to induce a green technology choice since
pollution output impacts demand less. Third, as consumers become more sensitive to
pollution, a lower tax is needed to induce the firm to choose the green technology.
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4.1.2 Second Period
Following the method of analysis of the first period, the optimal price and maximum profit
in the second period is:
p∗2 =





























+ αsj∗2 t))− 4αf(s
j∗
2 )








Recall from (3.2) that the demand faced by the firm in the second period depends on
both the first and second period technology choices. Note that both the optimal price
and the maximum profit in the second period depend on the technology choice of the first
period, linking the decision of the first period to the second period.
Proposition 3. Suppose the the market size, a, is sufficiently large to guarantee a positive
demand, and the pollution sensitivity of demand, β, is sufficiently small (otherwise the








Proposition 1, such that
1. if the firm has chosen the green technology in the first period, then choosing the














2. if the firm has chosen the dirty technology in the first period, then choosing the green














Moreover, in either case, the firm will choose the dirty technology in the second period
when t < tcritical and the green technology when t ≥ tcritical
Proof. We follow the same method used in the proof of Proposition 1 to obtain the result.
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It is important to note that we observe the symmetry in critical tax levels of the first
and second period due to the fact that the parameters defining the model do not change
throughout the game. In other words, we assume that the market conditions (such as
market size, pollution sensitivity of demand, etc.) remain fixed.







Since the form of p∗1 and p
∗
2 given a particular tax and technology choice are known, we are
now interested in determining the optimal technology choices of the firm. We simplify the
4-tuple notation to the technology choices of the firm, which we write as (sj∗1 , s
j∗
2 ).


















2) for t ≥ tcritical.
Proof. This result immediately follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, recalling the
assumption that the firm chooses the green technology if they are indifferent between the
green and dirty technology choice.
Lemma 4.1.1 states that at any tax below the critical tax level, the firm will choose the
dirty technology in the first and second period. It also states that at any tax above the
critical tax level, the firm will choose the green technology in both periods. Notice that
no matter the tax set by the regulator, the firm will never switch its technology choice






2) are not inducible by







never be chosen by the firm. The firm never chooses the strategy (sg1, s
d
2) due to the lack
of regulator commitment, and the firm never chooses the strategy (sd1, s
g
2) because it is a
weakly dominated strategy.
The elimination of the strategy (sg1, s
d
2) arises from a lack of regulator commitment. If
the regulator chooses a tax below the critical tax level, we know that the firm will choose







2) since its first period decision to choose the dirty technology has
already been made. Proposition 3 says that the firm will choose the dirty technology in the
second period when the tax set by the regulator is lower than the critical tax. Similarly, if
the regulator chooses a tax at or above the critical tax level, the firm will choose the green
technology in the second period. Notice that the strategy (sg1, s
d
2) was never considered.
This strategy is not ruled out because it is dominated by another strategy, it is simply not
possible for the firm to choose this strategy in this commitment structure.
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On the other hand, (sd1, s
g
2) is a weakly dominated strategy. Below the critical tax level,
we know that the strategy (sd1, s
d




2). At or above the
critical tax level, the firm will not choose the dirty technology in the first period, and thus
will never choose the strategy (sd1, s
g
2). However, assuming that the firm could make that
choice, we know that the strategy (sg1, s
g
2) yields a higher profit. Therefore, the strategy
(sd1, s
g
2) is weakly dominated and can be removed from consideration.
The fact that (sd1, s
g
2) is a weakly dominated strategy makes sense given the structure
of the model. Given the symmetry of the model between the two periods, apart from the







no matter the tax level. That is, the strategy (sd1, s
g





because the demand in the second period is dependent on both the first and second period
technology decision of the firm. The technology choice in the first period therefore has a
greater impact on total profits than the technology choice of the second period. The first
period technology choice impacts the demand in both the first and second period, while
the second period technology choice only impacts the demand in the second period. We
know from (3.1) and (3.2) that, all else being equal, the demand is lower when the firm
chooses the dirty technology compared to when they choose the green technology, as it
is assumed consumers are sensitive to the emissions output of firms. Assuming that the
firm will choose the dirty technology in one period and the green technology in the other,
it is better for the firm to choose the dirty technology in the second period. This only
negatively impacts the demand of the second period, while when the firm chooses the dirty
technology in the first period, the demand is negatively impacted in the first and second
period.
4.2 The case of regulator commitment
We now analyze the results in the commitment case, with game dynamics following Figure
3.1(b). At the beginning of the first period, the regulator commits to the tax level that
will apply to both the first and second period. Thus, the firm can be forward-looking,
using backwards induction to determine the optimal decision to maximize profit over both
periods.
The firm’s optimal decision over both periods consists of the optimal price and technol-
ogy choice for the first and second periods. The optimal price set by the firm in the first
and second periods can be calculated in the same way as Section 4.1 and the structure of
the optimal prices are the same as in the case of no commitment. That is, the optimal
price in the first and second period is given by (4.2) and (4.4) respectively. The prices
19
set by the regulator in the commitment case follow the same form as the prices in the no
commitment case because the two periods are linked only through the technology choices
and not the prices. The price set in the first period has no impact on the price set in
the second period, and vice versa. Recall that the only difference between the first and
second period is that demand in the second period depends on both the first and second
period technology choice. The price set by the firm in the first period has no impact on
the second period and vice versa. Thus, regulator commitment has no impact on the form
of the price set by the firm. However, this does not mean the prices set by the firm in the
case of regulator commitment are the same as when the regulator does not commit. This
is because the price set by the firm depends on the technology choice, which may differ in
the commitment case.
Once the optimal prices are known, the firm compares the resulting profits from each of
the technology choice combinations spanning both periods. More specifically, we compare















These technology choices depend on the parameter values that define the model.
Due to the regulator commitment, the firm can look at the total profit functions from
the beginning, and choose the technologies that maximize their total profit at every tax
















Proposition 4. In the commitment case, (sd1, s
g
2) is a weakly dominated strategy at every
tax level.
Proof. By Proposition 3, this strategy is dominated by (sd1, s
d
2) before the critical tax level,
and weakly dominated by (sg1, s
g
2) at or above the critical tax level.
Similar to the case of no commitment, (sd1, s
g
2) is also a weakly dominated strategy when
the regulator commits. However, recall from Section 4.1 that the strategy (sg1, s
d
2) was not
chosen by the firm due to the lack of regulator commitment. In the case of commitment,
however, this strategy may yield the best outcome below the critical tax level. It may be
advantageous for the firm to choose the green technology in the first period, even below
the critical tax level, since the first period technology choice impacts both the first and
second period demand. Since the firm maximizes their total profit in the case of regulator
commitment, (sg1, s
d
2) may be a viable strategy and is not ruled out.

















Proof. Follows from Proposition 3 and 4.









2) at or above the critical tax level.
4.3 Comparing the case of no commitment and com-
mitment
Here we analytically establish when and how the results of the commitment and no com-
mitment cases differ.
We begin our comparative analysis with the total profit of the firm in both cases. At
a particular tax level, the total profit of the firm in the commitment case will be greater
than or equal to the total profit in the case of no regulator commitment (Lemma 4.3.1).
We know that total the profit of the firm depends on the technology choice in both periods.
Since, in the case of regulator commitment, the firm can plan its second period decisions
from the beginning, the firm can maximize its total profit, rather than maximizing its
profit period by period.
Lemma 4.3.1. The total profit of the firm in the case of commitment is greater than or
equal to the total profit of the firm in the no commitment case at a particular tax level.
Proof. In the commitment case, the firm maximizes its total profit from the beginning in
the first period. In the no commitment case, the firm maximizes its first period profit,
then its second period profit given the decision it made in the firm period. In other words,
the firm has an added maximization constraint in the no commitment scenario: its first
period decisions. Adding a constraint to a mathematical program will never increase the
feasibility region; using the same objective means the two-period case is never worse than
the single-period case.
If the firm makes the same technology choice at every tax level in the commitment and
no commitment case, the resulting profits will be the same. We know from Lemma 4.1.1 and
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Lemma 4.2.1 that in both the commitment and no commitment cases, the firm will choose
(sg1, s
g
2) at or above the critical tax level. As such, the outcomes (firm profit, environmental
impact, consumer surplus, and social welfare) will be the same above the critical tax level.
We are interested in determining the differences between the two scenarios; to identify the
difference, for the remainder of this section we only consider the case of the tax level below
the critical tax level.
Proposition 5 states that we will only observe a different outcome between the com-
mitment and no commitment case when the firm in the commitment case selects (sg1, s
d
2),
which only occurs below the critical tax level. Recall that the firm never chooses (sg1, s
d
2) in
the case of no commitment (Section 4.1.2), and always chooses (sd1, s
d
2) below the critical
tax level.
Proposition 5. The only way for the outcome to be different between the commitment
and no commitment case at a particular tax level is if in the case of commitment, the firm
chooses (sg1, s
d
2). This only happens below the critical tax level.
Proof. Above the critical tax level, the firm will choose (sg1, s
g
2) in both the case of commit-
ment and no commitment (Lemma 4.1.1 and Lemma 4.2.1. In the case of no commitment,
the firm will choose (sd1, s
d
2) below the critical tax level. In the case of commitment, the






2) below the critical tax level. Thus, the only way to get




We now wish to compare the social welfare between the two cases. Recall that the
social welfare function defined by (3.10) is made up of the firm’s total profit, consumer
surplus, and environmental impact. We have already established that the total profit of
the firm is greater than or equal to the total profit in the case of no regulator commitment.
We obtain a similar result for the consumer surplus in Lemma 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.3.2. The total consumer surplus in the case of commitment is greater than or
equal to the consumer surplus in the no commitment case at a particular tax level.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 5 that the outcomes of the commitment and no commitment
scenarios only differ when the firm chooses (sg1, s
d





the case of no commitment, which we know will only occur below the critical tax level.







2) ≥ CSTotal(sd1, sd2), and we can restrict our search to below the critical tax
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2), proving the result.
Lastly, we must look at the environmental impact. Specifically, we must compare the
environmental impact of the firm below the critical tax level when it selects (sg1, s
d
2) in the
commitment case and (sd1, s
d
2) and in the case of no commitment.
Proposition 6. The total environmental impact resulting from the firm choosing (sg1, s
d
2) is
less than the environmental impact when the firm chooses (sd1, s
d
2), for every t ∈ [0, tcritical].
Proof. Recall from Section 3 that the emissions per unit produced given the technology







the sake of space we adopt the notation sg1 = s
g
2 = s




the results of the environmental impact functions, but include the period notation in the
function inputs to distinguish when the decisions are being made. We compare the relative
values of the total environmental impacts (EITotal = EI1 + EI2) when the firm chooses
the dirty technology in both periods and when the firm chooses the green technology in
the first period and the dirty technology in the second period. Applying the conditions of













































2) for every t ∈ [0, tcritical].
Combining the results of Lemma 4.3.1, Lemma 4.3.2 and Proposition 6, at any given
tax level, the social welfare will be greater or equal in the commitment model compared
to the no commitment model.
Proposition 7. At any tax level, t, the total social welfare over both periods will be
greater or equal in the commitment model compared to the no commitment model.
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Proof. Recall that the social welfare, defined by (3.10) is
∑2
i=1(πi + CSi − EIi). At a
particular tax level, we know that the firm profit and consumer surplus over both periods
is greater or equal in the commitment case compared to the case of no commitment (Lemma
4.3.1, Lemma 4.3.2). By Proposition 5, we know that the outcomes can only be different
between the two cases when the firm chooses (sg1, s
d
2) in the case of regulator commitment,
which occurs below the critical tax level when the firm will choose (sd1, s
d
2) in the case of
no commitment. More specifically, the environmental impacts in the commitment and no
commitment cases will only differ below the critical tax level when the firm chooses (sg1, s
d
2)
in the case of regulator commitment and (sd1, s
d
2) in the case of no commitment. From
Proposition 6, we know that if the environmental impacts differ between the two cases at
a particular tax level, it will be lower in the commitment case. Thus, at any tax level, the
social welfare in the commitment case is greater than or equal to the social welfare in the
case of no commitment.
In other words, if the regulator picked the same tax level for both the commitment and
no commitment scenario, it is better for regulator to commit. However, the optimal tax,
t∗, may be different in the commitment and no commitment model. This is because the
regulator is rational and social welfare maximizing in both cases. Proposition 7 does not
explicitly claim that the social welfare evaluated at the optimal tax in the commitment case
is greater than the social welfare evaluated at the optimal tax in the case of no commitment.
However, we now show that this is indeed the fact:
Proposition 8. The social welfare evaluated at the optimal tax in the commitment case is




Proof. We call the optimal tax of the commitment and no commitment case t∗c and t
∗
n
respectively. We call the social welfare of the commitment and no commitment case SWc
and SWn respectively. By Proposition 7 we know that SWc(t
∗
n) ≥ SWn(t∗n). However, by
the definition of the optimal tax, SWc(t
∗
c) ≥ SWc(t∗n). By transitivity, SWc(t∗c) ≥ SWn(t∗n),
proving the result.
Proposition 8 establishes that the optimal social welfare in the commitment case is
higher than the optimal social welfare in the case of no commitment. In other words, when
the regulator commits, they are always able to achieve an equal or greater social welfare




In this section we directly compare the results of the no commitment and commitment
case, verifying many of the results of Section 4 and gaining insights into the optimal social
welfare and tax levels. Lastly, we investigate the sensitivity of the critical tax level in the
commitment and no commitment case. Due to the multiple periods in the model, the linked
demand, and the discontinuous nature of the optimal social welfare function, determining
the optimal tax, though feasible, is not possible to write in a concise manner. Instead, we
derive the optimal social welfare function and tax level in Mathematica (Wolfram Research
Inc., 2019), and numerically investigate their sensitivity and behavior in this section. Note
that we use Mathematica’s internal discretization methods to generate the plots in this
section.1
5.1 Comparing the case of no commitment and com-
mitment
To compare the case of no regulator commitment and regulator commitment, we consider
the following examples:
Example 1. Suppose a = 10, α = 2, β = 1, γ = 2, f = 0, sgi = 1, s
d
i = 2, with:
(a) ε = 0.6, low regulator concern for the environment
1Please see https://reference.wolfram.com/language/ref/Plot.html for details.
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(b) ε = 0.8, moderate regulator concern for the environment
(c) ε = 1.1, high regulator concern for the environment
Recall that the total optimal firm profit function for both the commitment and no
commitment case, comprised of the sum of (4.3) and (4.5), is independent of the regulator’s
concern for the environment, ε. That is, although the tax set by the regulator, which
depends on ε, impacts the profit of the firm, the optimal profit as a function of the tax
does not depend on ε directly. Thus, we can analyze the decisions of the firm without
differentiating between Example 1(a)-(c). The regulator’s concern for the environment will
become relevant when determining the optimal tax level. First we present the decisions of
the firm in the case of no regulator commitment.
The firm will set their first period price as determined in (4.2). Evaluated at the











which depends on the technology choice of the firm as well as the tax set by the
regulator. Figure 5.1 shows the optimal profit at a given tax level when the firm chooses
the dirty technology (red) or when then firm chooses the green technology (green). The
profit of the firm when using the green technology is equal to the profit of the firm when
using the dirty technology only when the regulator sets the tax to the critical tax level, 1
2
(cf. Proposition 1). Also by Proposition 1, the firm will choose the dirty technology from
0 < t < 1
2
, and the green technology from t ≥ 1
2
, shown by the black dotted line which
represents the optimal profit at any given tax level in Figure 5.1.
Recall that in the case of no regulator commitment, the firm behaves myopically. Thus
in the second period, the firm maximizes its second period profit given its first period












which depends on both the first and second period technology choice, and the tax set
by the regulator. Figure 5.2 shows the profit in the second period evaluated at the optimal
prices in the first and second period, given the possible technology choices in the first and
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First Period Profit with No Regulator Commitment
Figure 5.1: First period profit with no regulator commitment when the dirty (red) or green
(green) technology is selected
second period. Since we know from the first period that the firm will choose the dirty
technology in the first period below the critical tax and the green technology at or above
the critical tax, it restricts the decision of the firm in the second period. More specifically,













2) above the critical tax. At these parameter values, below the critical tax, the
firm will choose the dirty technology in both periods, and the firm will choose the green
technology in both periods at or after the critical tax level (Figure 5.2). The optimal profit
function (black dotted line) in Figure 5.2 is discontinuous at the critical tax level.
In the case of regulator commitment, the firm can be forward looking since the tax level
in the second period is known from the beginning of the first period. We can analyze the
firm’s decision with Figure 5.3, which shows the total profit given the firm’s technology
choices. That is, rather than looking at the profit period-by-period, the firm is able to
maximize its total profit from the beginning when the regulator commits. By Figure 5.3,
the firm will choose (sd1, s
d









when t ≥ 1
2
.
We note that although the weightings of the first and second period technology choice
in the second period demand are assumed equal (see equation (3.2)), our main results
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Second Period Profit with No Regulator Commitment
Figure 5.2: Second period profit with no regulator commitment given the firm’s technology
choice in both periods
Figure 5.3: Total profit of the firm with regulator commitment given the firm’s technology
choice in both periods
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above hold even when the technology choices have different weightings. In particular, in
the case of no commitment, the firm will still choose the dirty technology in both periods
below the critical tax level and the green technology in both periods at or above the critical
tax level. In the case of commitment, the firm will still choose the (sg1, s
g
2) strategy at or






2) strategy below the critical tax level.






2) strategy, t = 0.1069 in the
case of Example 1 with equal weightings, is impacted if different weightings are used.
We now analyze the social welfare functions to determine the optimal tax. The black
line in Figures 5.4-5.6 is the realized social welfare function at a particular tax level, taking
into account the decisions of the firm. That is, we determined the technology decisions
made by the firm at every tax level, and now plot the resulting optimal social welfare from
those decisions. Notice that the black line is discontinuous whenever the firm switches
technology choices. A detailed summary of the results is outlined in Table 5.1. When
comparing the results of the commitment and no commitment case at each value of ε,
‘favourable’ results for the regulator are shown in green. The regulator is indifferent to
the price and technology choices of the firm, and is only interested in the social welfare
(firm profit, environmental impact, and consumer surplus) derived from the firm’s choices.
A lower tax and environmental impact, and a higher profit, consumer surplus, and social
welfare are considered favourable for the regulator.
Starting with Example 1(a), low regulator concern for the environment, the social wel-
fare function is the solid black line in Figure 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) for the case of no commitment
and commitment, respectively. The optimal tax for each scenario is the tax that results
in the largest value of the corresponding social welfare function. We find that the optimal
tax is t∗ = 0 and t∗ = 0.1069 for the case of no regulator commitment and commitment,
respectively; with the commitment case yielding a higher social welfare. The results of
the no commitment case are in line with the findings of Krass et al. (2013), who also find
that when the regulator is not too concerned with the environment, the optimal tax will
be zero and the firm will choose the dirty technology. We find that in the case of commit-
ment, the regulator chooses a higher tax that results in a lower environmental impact but
also lower firm profits and consumer surplus (more detailed results outlined in Table 5.1).
Importantly, the social welfare is higher in this case. In summary, when the government
concern for the environment is low, the firm is better off in the no commitment case but
the overall social welfare is higher in the case of commitment.
Example 1(b) explores the case of moderate environmental concern by the regulator (cf.
Figure 5.5(a) and 5.5(b) for the case of no commitment and commitment, respectively). We
find that the optimal tax is t∗ = 1
2
and t∗ = 0.1069 for the case of no regulator commitment
and commitment, respectively; with the commitment case yielding a higher social welfare.
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We find that in the commitment case, the regulator obtains a higher social welfare at a
lower tax, with higher profits for firms and a higher consumer surplus. However, in the
case of no commitment, the environmental impact is lower.
Lastly, Example 1(c) investigates the case of high environmental concern by the reg-
ulator (cf. Figure 5.6(a) and 5.6(b) for the case of no commitment and commitment,
respectively). We find that the optimal tax in both the commitment and no commitment
case is t = 1
2
, yielding the same firm profit, consumer surplus, environmental impact, and
social welfare in both cases. When the regulator’s concern for the environment is high
enough, the commitment policy will not impact the outcomes. This is because when the
regulator is highly concerned about the environment, the firm will behave in a more en-
vironmentally friendly way, even in the absence of commitment. A higher environmental
concern results in a higher tax. Firm profit and environmental impact are decreasing in
tax. Thus as the regulator is more concerned about the environment rather than firm
profit, the profit lost by increasing the tax will be more than compensated by the utility
gained from the decrease in environmental impact. We know that above the critical tax
level, the firm will make the same decisions regardless of the commitment policy of the
regulator.
Notice that in all three cases, the social welfare of the commitment case is greater
than or equal to the social welfare in the case of no commitment, following the results
of Proposition 8. Thus the commitment case always leads to just as favourable or more
favourable outcomes than the no commitment case, from the perspective of the regulator.
However, as is seen in Table 5.1, the firm profit, environmental impact, consumer surplus
are not always greater in the case of commitment.
It is important to notice that due to the discontinuous nature of the optimal social
welfare function, the optimal tax level is highly sensitive. In other words, small changes to
the tax level around the critical tax may have detrimental impacts on the outcomes. We
explore this in-depth in the next subsection.
5.2 Sensitivity of the optimal tax level
In this section we examine the stability/sensitivity of the optimal tax level. In other words,
we examine the outcome if the regulator sets a tax slightly above or below the optimal
tax in Examples 1(a)-(c), and compare the outcomes in the cases of no commitment and
commitment. This sensitivity analysis may be of use to regulators for a number of reasons.
In practice, the optimal tax may be hard to determine, as the regulator would have to
30







Social Welfare with No Regulator Commitment
(a) No commitment







Social Welfare with Regulator Commitment
(b) Commitment
Figure 5.4: Comparing the social welfare in the no commitment and commitment case,
with ε = 0.6 (Example 1(a))
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Social Welfare with No Regulator Commitment
(a) No commitment







Social Welfare with Regulator Commitment
(b) Commitment
Figure 5.5: Comparing the social welfare in the no commitment and commitment case,
with ε = 0.8 (Example 1(b))
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Social Welfare with No Regulator Commitment
(a) No commitment








Social Welfare with Regulator Commitment
(b) Commitment
Figure 5.6: Comparing the social welfare in the no commitment and commitment case,
with ε = 1.1 (Example 1(c))
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p∗1 3.000 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500
p∗2 2.500 2.750 3.250 2.750 3.250 3.250
sj1
∗
dirty green green green green green
sj2
∗
dirty dirty green dirty green green
t∗ 0 0.1069 0.5000 0.1069 0.500 0.500
π∗Total 6.500 5.477 3.125 5.477 3.125 3.125
EI∗ 6.000 4.179 2.800 5.573 3.850 3.850
CS∗ 3.250 2.739 1.563 2.739 1.563 1.563
SW ∗ 3.750 4.037 1.888 2.643 0.8380 0.8380
Table 5.1: Summary of results at the optimal firm and regulator decisions (more favourable
outcomes are shown in green)
estimate the parameter values. Public opinion on carbon taxes, as well as political limi-
tations may also prevent regulators from setting the optimal tax level. Thus, in practice,
the regulator may knowingly or unknowingly set sub-optimal taxes. Overall, we find that
outcomes of the no commitment case are more sensitive to small changes in the optimal
tax than the commitment case. That is, small deviations from the optimal tax result in
unfavourable outcomes (such as lower social welfare, firm profit, and consumer surplus,
and higher environmental impact). Moreover, these negative impacts tend to be greater in
the no commitment case than in the commitment case.
Suppose κ > 0, a very small number such that κ2 ≈ 0. Notice that in Examples
1(a)-(c), the firm switches technologies at t = t∗ − κ, and does not when t = t∗ + κ (see
Figures 5.4-5.6). When the firm switches technologies, there are significant impacts on
the resulting social welfare, whereas when the firm makes the same technology choice at
a slightly higher tax, the changes are negligible. Thus we focus our sensitivity analysis on
the case where t = t∗ − κ. We now consider the outcomes when the regulator sets a tax
t∗ − κ, that is, a tax slightly below the optimal tax level.
We consider how this impacts the results of Example 1(b) and Example 1(c), and
summarize the results in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, respectively. We employ the assumption
that κ2 = 0 in the results of the tables to simplify results. When results are more favourable
at t = t∗ − κ the percent change is shown in green, and the percent change is shown in
red when the results are less favourable. We do not perform this analysis for example
Example 1(a), since the optimal tax in the case of no commitment is zero, so t∗− κ would
34
be negative, and the regulator cannot set a negative tax. In the following analysis, we
consider κ = 0.001.
The results of a small change in the optimal tax level in Example 1(b) are summarized
in Table 5.2. Starting with the case of commitment, we compare the results of when the
regulator sets the optimal tax t∗ = 0.1069 to t = 0.1069−κ. We find that by decreasing the
optimal tax slightly, the profit and consumer surplus will actually increase, but negligibly
so. However, the environmental impact will increase and social welfare will decrease.
In the case of no commitment, we compare the results of when the regulator sets the
optimal tax t∗ = 0.5000 to t = 0.5000− κ. This results in non-negligible decreases in firm
profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, as well as an increase in the environmental
impact. When compared to the commitment case: (1) the firm profit decreases by 19.81%
in the no commitment case, while it increases negligibly in the commitment case; (2)
the environmental impact increases by 6.550% more in the commitment case; (3) the
consumer surplus decreases by 19.83% with no commitment, and increases negligibly with
commitment; (4) the social welfare decreases by 108.0% more in the case of no commitment.
Thus, the commitment model is less sensitive to the small change in the tax level set by
the regulator in every outcome except for the environmental impact. However, we note
that the tax level is smaller in the case of commitment, so a higher environmental impact
is expected. A direct comparison in the sensitivity of the optimal tax levels between the
commitment and no commitment case is more sensible when the optimal taxes are the
same, as in Example 1(c).
We now consider a small change in the optimal tax level in Example 1(c), with the re-
sults outlined in Table 5.3. In this case, the optimal tax levels are equal in the commitment
and no commitment case. That is, if only analyzed at the optimal tax level, the outcomes
in the commitment and no commitment cases are the same. However, the behaviour is
different between the two cases when we investigate the outcomes at sup-optimal tax lev-
els. A small change in the optimal tax level causes a greater decrease in profit, consumer
surplus, and social welfare in the case of no commitment. It also causes a greater increase
in environmental impact in the no commitment case. In other words, at t − κ, the com-
mitment model has more favourable outcomes for firms, consumers, the environment, and
the regulator.
These results show that in the commitment case, the optimal tax is less sensitive to
small deviations from the optimal tax. This is because of the discontinuous nature of the
social welfare function, which arises from the discrete technology choices. In Examples
1(b) and (c), the optimal tax is the critical tax level. At the critical tax level, the firm will
choose the green technology in both periods, in both the commitment and no commitment
case. A small change in the optimal tax, namely at t∗ − κ, prompts a switch to the dirty
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Commitment No commitment
t = 0.1069 t = 0.1069− κ % change t = 0.5000 t = 0.5000− κ % change
sj1
∗
green dirty - green dirty -
sj2
∗
dirty dirty - green dirty -
πTotal 5.477 5.486 0.1670% 3.125 2.506 19.81%
EI 5.573 7.322 31.39% 3.850 4.806 24.84%
CS 2.739 2.743 0.1304% 1.563 1.253 19.83%
SW 2.643 0.9065 65.70% 0.838 −1.047 225.0%
Table 5.2: Summary of Results, ε = 0.8, just below the optimal tax, t∗−κ, where κ = 0.001
Commitment No commitment
t = 0.5000 t = 0.5000− κ % Change t = 0.5000 t = 0.5000− κ % Change
sj1
∗
green green - green dirty -
sj2
∗
green dirty - green dirty -
πTotal 3.125 3.130 0.1600% 3.125 2.506 19.81%
EI 2.800 5.506 96.63% 2.800 6.609 136.0%
CS 1.563 1.566 0.1599% 1.563 1.253 19.83%
SW 1.888 −0.8105 142.9% 1.888 −2.850 250.9%
Table 5.3: Summary of Results, ε = 1.1, just below the optimal tax, t∗−κ, where κ = 0.001
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technology in both periods in the case of no commitment, whereas with commitment,
the firm will still choose the green technology in the first period, and switch to the dirty
technology in the second period. Recall from Section 4.1 in the case of no commitment,
the firm either chooses the green technology in both periods (at or above the critical tax
level), or the dirty technology in both periods (below the critical tax level). However, in
the case of commitment, the firm may also choose the strategy (sg1, s
d
2). Thus, there is an






2) in the commitment case. In the case






2) when there is a small
decrease in the optimal tax level. In contrast, when there is commitment, the firm will first
switch to (sg1, s
d




2) only after much
larger decreases to the optimal tax level. This makes the commitment case more robust –




We now discuss the theoretical and managerial insights of our work.
6.1 Theoretical Insights
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a two-period carbon tax model
that provides a direct comparison between a commitment and a no commitment policy.
The current literature does address uncertainty in carbon tax policies, but as Section 2
discusses in detail, we are the first to assume a true baseline of no regulator commitment.
That is, a lack of regulator commitment in the literature is modelled by a tax policy
following a probability distribution. In our model, the firm has no information about the
tax level that will be set by the regulator in the second period, and thus behaves myopically.
A natural extension of this work may be to consider that the firm has a continuum
of technologies to choose from. However, we did not find this modelling consideration
analytically tractable. The existence of multiple, linked periods in our model makes analysis
difficult. Modellers who wish to incorporate a continuum of technology choices should
investigate simplifying other areas of the model, such as the demand or cost functions, to
obtain analytically tractable solutions. For example, modellers may explore the impact of
using a negative exponential demand function rather than a linear demand function.
Although we show that the optimal social welfare is always greater or equal in the case
of commitment at the optimal tax level, the environmental impact is not always lower
(Example 1(b)). This is because the optimal tax levels may differ under the commitment
and no commitment policies. In our model, the demand is tied to the firm’s technology
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choice, and the first period technology choice is linked to the second period demand. The
overall emissions of the firm are not linked between the two periods. Thus, introducing
regulator commitment may not necessarily lower overall pollution emissions, but will in-
stead make the use of the green technology in the first period more likely. Modellers who
wish to focus more on total emissions rather than technology choices made by the firm
should link the demand between periods by total emissions. However, this may be a less
realistic assumption – as it would require consumers to have information about overall
environmental impact of a firm rather than just the production process/technology used.
The assumption that consumers are solely concerned with total emissions would not
extend to the case of multiple firms. As a thought experiment, suppose there is one firm
that produces 100 products, but they use a green production process that emits 1 kg of
CO2 per product, which results in 100 kg of CO2 in total emissions. Now consider 10
firms, who each produce 10 products, but they use a dirty production process that leads
to 10 kg of CO2 per product, which results in 100 kg of CO2 per firm, or 1000 kg of CO2
in total. With a single green firm, 100 products are produced with 100 kg of CO2 in total
emissions, while with 10 dirty firms, 100 products are produced with 1000 kg of CO2 in
total emissions. Surely the more environmentally-friendly way to produce the 100 products
is through the single green firm. However, if consumers are only concerned about total
emissions of the firm and not emissions per product (i.e. technology choice in our model),
then consumers will view the green and dirty firms in this thought experiment as equally
good for the environment, since they both emit 100 kg of CO2 in total. The assumption
that consumers are only concerned about total emissions may be sufficient in the case of
a single monopolistic firm, but it may not be valid in practice. Our results, along with
this example, show that in future work, it may be beneficial to link the demand between
periods by total emissions and technology choice, not one or the other.
Regulators may also encourage firms to prioritize total emissions and technology choice
by taxing firms on their total emissions, as we do in our model, and providing subsidies to
firms who use greener technologies. Krass et al. (2013) consider both subsidies and taxes,
but not with regulator commitment. In our model, that may look like regulators increasing
or decreasing γ, the pollution sensitivity of the variable cost. The results of using γ as a




Our work emphasizes the value of carbon tax policy commitment on social welfare. We
show that the optimal social welfare obtained by the regulator is always greater when the
regulator is willing to commit to a two-period tax at the beginning, rather than announcing
their tax at the beginning of each of the two periods (Proposition 8). Thus, it is in the
regulator’s best interest to commit in order to obtain more favourable societal outcomes.
Although it is noteworthy that the optimal social welfare is greater in the commitment
case, Proposition 7 is a much stronger result. It states that the social welfare is greater in
the commitment case when compared to the no commitment case at every tax level (Propo-
sition 7). This is a stronger result because, for a variety of reasons, the regulator may not
be able to set the optimal tax. Practically speaking, the regulator may not be able to accu-
rately estimate all the model parameters, resulting in the regulator unintentionally setting
a sub-optimal tax. Political feasibility, public opinion, and the socioeconomic makeup of
a regulator’s constituents are just a few of the multitude of factors that may require the
firm to set sub-optimal tax levels. Our model shows that it is always in the regulator’s
best interest to commit, even when they are not selecting the optimal tax.
We find that regulator commitment is not always beneficial for firms, as we see in
Example 1(a) that the firm can obtain a higher profit at the optimal tax level in the case
of no commitment. This occurs when the regulator’s concern for the environment is low.
It is important to note that result arises from the fact that the optimal tax is higher in
the commitment case. Lemma 4.3.1 states that the profit is always higher in the case of
regulator commitment, when the commitment and no commitment case is compared at
the same tax level. It makes sense that low regulator concern for the environment leads to
no tax, and this would be beneficial to firms as profit decreases with tax level.
In the numerical examples we show that there are cases in which the regulator may
achieve a higher social welfare at a lower tax in the commitment case (Example 1(b), mod-
erate regulator commitment). It is known empirically that people have strong objections
to higher carbon taxes, potentially making lower taxes more politically feasible (Carattini
et al., 2017; Gevrek and Uyduranoglu, 2015; Sælen and Kallbekken, 2011). The regulator is
better off as this yields a higher social welfare at a lower tax, while the firm also achieves a
higher profit. Thus it is beneficial to both players in the game for the regulator to commit.
The numerical experiments, particularly Example 1(c) shows that when the regulator
has a high enough concern for the environment, the optimal tax and social welfare are the
same in both the commitment and no commitment cases. We show that the firm will make
the same decision with or without regulator commitment when the optimal tax is at or
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above the critical tax level. Since the environmental impact decreases with tax level, when
the regulator’s concern for the environment grows the optimal tax may increase. Once the
optimal tax reaches or exceeds the critical tax level, we know that the optimal outcome
in the commitment or no commitment case will be the same. However, we show in the
sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2 that although the optimal outcomes are equivalent, the
sub-optimal outcomes are more favourable in the case of commitment: for firms, regulators,
the environment, and for consumers. Thus, a high concern for the environment cannot
entirely ‘replace’ regulator commitment if the regulator needs the political flexibility to set
sub-optimal tax levels.
Proposition 2 provides insights to regulators on how to lower the critical tax level,
that is, the tax at which the firm switches their technology choice. In the case of no
regulator commitment, the critical tax represents the tax level at which the firm switches
from choosing the dirty technology in both periods to choosing the green technology in
both periods. In the case of regulator commitment, it represents the tax level at which
the firm chooses the green technology in both periods, before this tax, the firm will either
choose the dirty technology in both periods or the green technology in the first period and
the dirty technology in the second period. The critical tax increases with the pollution
sensitivity of variable cost. That is, when dirty technologies are much cheaper than green
technologies, the critical tax increases. Regulators may subsidize green technologies to
lower the critical tax level, if high taxes are politically unfavourable. Regulators may also
invest in research and development in green technologies in order to lower the pollution
sensitivity of the variable cost. The critical tax also decreases with pollution sensitivity
of demand. To lower the critical tax level, regulators may focus on increasing consumers’
care for the environment, through education on the negative outcomes of climate change,
for example. In addition, regulators may require firms to be more transparent about their
production process to consumers, so consumers are able to make more informed decisions




In this article, we investigate the impact of carbon tax policy commitment on firm profits,
optimal tax levels, and overall social welfare. We consider a two-period interaction between
the regulator and the firm. More specifically, we consider a monopolistic, profit-maximizing
firm that sets the product price and chooses between two production processes that vary
in emissions output per unit produced at the beginning of each period. The regulator sets
a carbon tax at the beginning of each period to maximize social welfare. We examine two
cases: the case of commitment where the regulator sets one tax for both periods, allowing
the firm to be forward-looking, and the case of no commitment, where the government sets
the tax at the beginning of each period, which results in the firm behaving myopically. This
direct comparison gives policy makers insights into the importance of carbon tax policy
commitment.
We show that regulators can achieve a greater social welfare under the commitment
policy compared to the no commitment policy, and in certain cases, at a lower optimal tax
level. In addition, firm profit and consumer surplus are always greater, and the environmen-
tal impact is lower under the commitment policy when compared to the no commitment
policy at a particular tax level. Another key insight from this work is that the outcomes of
the commitment policy are less sensitive to small decreases in the optimal tax level, which
is of interest to regulators who may have to resort to sub-optimal tax levels for a variety
of reasons.
An immediate extension of this work would be to consider technology switching costs.
In this work, the technology costs differ, but only through the variable production cost.
This is an oversimplification as, in reality, changing the production process to a greener or
dirtier technology may be costly. No fixed costs related to changing technology implies, for
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example, no costs associated with the installation of new equipment. The results with this
addition will likely be nontrivial. Krass et al. (2013), considering the impact of a carbon
tax on firm technology choice, determine that the difference in fixed cost across different
technologies results in non-monotone behaviour by firms, that is, higher tax levels may
initially induce the use of green technologies, but larger increases may cause a switch back
to dirty technologies.
Another future research direction could include the consideration of firms being in-
volved in contracts with other members of their supply chain, binding them to a particular
technology choice for the duration of the contract. The literature suggests this is a relevant
and important modelling aspect. For example, Gao and Zheng (2017) consider the firm to
be the Stackelberg leader, because firms enter into long-term investments regarding their
production processes that determine their emissions output, while policies are often uncer-
tain in the long term. However, in these works, the impact of policy commitment is not
considered. Thus, comparing commitment and no commitment policies while firms are able
to enter into technology contracts of varying duration and costs may provide additional
needed insights.
A limitation of this work is that many regulator’s use the revenue generated from
environmental tax policies to fund green projects. For example, the regulator could use
the first period tax revenue to compensate firm’s switching to the green technology in the
second period. Due to the structure of the cost function, including a tax revenue term in
the social welfare function would cancel out the tax the firm pays to the regulator (see
Section 3.2), and thus our current model cannot support this extension. The exploration of
alternative cost functions warrant future investigation in order to account for tax revenue
in the social welfare function.
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APPENDICES




2) ≥ πTotal(sd1, sd2) in the commit-
ment case, below the critical tax level. This result is used to prove Lemma 4.3.2.
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